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ARTICLE

Citation Stickiness, ComputerAssisted Legal Research, and the
Universe of Thinkable Thoughts
Aaron S. Kirschenfeld*
Alexa Z. Chew**

Introduction
This article seeks to answer two main questions. The first is whether
courts cited the same cases as the parties more often during the print era
than during the digital era. The second is what, if anything, the answer
to the first question can contribute to the debate about how print-era
forms of organizing and describing case law influenced researchers’
behavior. To that end, we sampled cases from 1957, 1987, and 2017, and
used “citation stickiness” to study the differences in how parties and
judges cited authorities during each of those years. In short, we found that
there is less agreement about what case law authorities are relevant to an
appeal between parties and judges in 1957 than in 1987 and 2017. This
casts doubt on the existence of a cozy “universe of thinkable thoughts,” or
the longstanding theory that classification schemes like West’s American
Digest System led to greater coherence and stability in the development of
common law in the United States.
In section I of this article, we review the literature on how switching
from print research to digital research influences lawyers’ research habits
and conceptions of the law. We then look at prior empirical studies
assessing the kind of law found by researchers within different research
environments or by using different research processes.

* Digital Initiatives Law Librarian and Clinical Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
** Clinical Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, who had top notch help from her UNC Law
research assistants, Taylor Carrere and Marshall Newman. This study would not have been possible without their careful
work.
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In section II of this article, we introduce the citation stickiness metric
and describe our methodology.
In section III we present our results, which show that there is a
significant difference between 1957, 1987, and 2017 in how often courts
cite cases originally cited in at least one party’s brief. We also explore some
other possible conclusions gleaned from our data. Finally, we speculate
on the reasons why we found what we found and identify questions for
further study.

I. “Thinkable thoughts” and legal research
This section considers the issues raised by the vibrant and longstanding debate over the influence of print-era case law classification
systems on legal research and the development of common law in the
United States.
A. The influences of print-era case law classification systems
Did tools developed during the print era to publish, describe, and
classify case law also influence the ways lawyers thought about the law
and, consequently, the way that law developed? Many law librarians and
legal scholars have taken up this question in the past forty years.1 Some
have contended that the American Digest System had a good deal of
influence.2 Some, less so.3
The arguments advanced are complex, but for our purposes can be
reasonably simplified as follows: print-era classification systems and
patterns of publication created coherence and stability in the landscape
of legal information. Early digital sources mirrored the structure of these
systems and patterns of publication, but new tools and sources made
available during the digital era would challenge the ways that researchers
come to know law.
The work of Bob Berring deserves special attention.4 It posits that
tools like the American Digest System and the headnotes that constituted
it normalized “legal language and legal meanings . . . [forming] the ground
1 Stefan H. Krieger & Katrina Fischer Kuh, Accessing Law: An Empirical Study Exploring the Influence of Legal Research
Medium, 16 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 757, 759 n.6 (2014) (collecting articles and studies about “the influence of digitization
on the law generally and on legal research specifically”).
2 See Richard A. Danner, Influences of the Digest Classification System: What Can We Know?, 33 Legal Reference Servs.
Q. 117, 128 n.49 (2014) (collecting works about “the extent of the digest’s influences in categorical terms”).
3 See, e.g., Peter C. Schanck, Taking Up Barkan’s Challenge: Looking at the Judicial Process and Legal Research, 82 Law. Libr.
J. 1 (1990).
4 For an excellent summary of Berring’s work on this topic, see Richard A. Danner, Legal Information and the Development
of American Law: Writings on the Form and Structure of the Published Law, 99 Law Libr. J. 193 (2007).
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of integration and coherence in substantive law.” These tools, in turn,
influenced “the way legal researchers conceptualized the law.”5 Indeed, the
classification systems and publishing patterns created “a cozy universe”
of legal meaning such that “all of those trained within it have created a
conceptual universe of thinkable thoughts that has enormous power.”6
Plenty of other scholars have addressed questions about “the extent
to which the Key Number System influences the law itself.”7 Barbara
Bintliff described the West digests as “allowing researchers to understand
the relationship, context, and hierarchy of identified rules . . . . [Lawyers]
have to think in terms that match its organization.”8 Before the advent
of computer-assisted legal research (CALR), digests and “a predictable,
stable judicial system . . . became almost inextricably intertwined.”9 Bintliff
noted the difficulties of constructing computerized systems that would
allow researchers to discover legal rules as readily as was possible in
the print era, but left the door open to technological advances someday
catching up.10 More on that in a moment.
Carol Bast and Ransford Pyle added to that line of thinking with
words of further warning. 11 They described the move to CALR as a
paradigm shift away from coherence and stability in the law, legal thinking
and, by extension, legal research.12 The paper concluded that digital
resources and processes will bring about “a more primitive legal regime,”
lessening lawyers’ consensus understanding of hierarchic legal concepts.13
F. Allan Hanson then added an anthropological perspective to
this argument in his analysis of information management systems and
the law.14 In seeking to explain what differentiated print resources and

5 Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 15, 22 (1987); see
also Robert C. Berring, Ring Dang Doo, 1 Green Bag 2d 3, 3 (1997) (“Without realizing it, we all depended on West for
giving us ways to think coherently about the hundreds of thousands of cases that were stuffed into the reporters.”).
6 Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and the World of Thinkable Thoughts, 2 J. App. Prac. & Process 305, 311 (2000) [hereinafter Berring, World of Thinkable Thoughts]; see also Robert C. Berring, Legal Information and the Search for Cognitive
Authority, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 1673, 1693 (2000) [hereinafter Berring, Search for Cognitive Authority] (“Generations of lawyers
learned to conceptualize legal problems using the categories of the Topics and Key Numbers of the American Digest
System.”).
7 Daniel Dabney, The Universe of Thinkable Thoughts: Literary Warrant and West’s Key Number System, 99 Law Libr. J. 229,
230 (2007).
8 Barbara Bintliff, From Creativity to Computerese: Thinking Like a Lawyer in the Computer Age, 88 Law Libr. J. 338, 343
(1996).
9 Id. at 344.
10 Id. at 351.
11 Carol M. Bast & Ransford C. Pyle, Legal Research in the Computer Age: A Paradigm Shift?, 93 Law Libr. J. 285 (2001).
12 Id. at 286.
13 Id. at 302.
14 F. Allan Hanson, From Key Numbers to Keywords: How Automation Has Transformed the Law, 94 Law Libr. J. 563
(2002).
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research processes, he also focused on the “hierarchical, taxonomic classification” of the digests, arguing that their categories “have been reified into
principles thought to preside over ‘the law,’ understood as a self-contained,
independently existing system.”15 Indeed, Hanson saw automated research
as a threat to the doctrine of precedent, a cornerstone of the common
law.16 As for research, computerized systems were apt to turn up a wider
variety of cases that could be considered precedential, unlike in the print
era, when “opposing attorneys would tend to develop their arguments on
the basis of the same cases, nearly all of which were familiar to judges and
experts in that field of law.”17
Jean Stefancic and critical race theory co-founder Richard Delgado
also weighed in, arguing that “professionally prepared research and
indexing systems . . . function like DNA; they enable the current system
to replicate itself endlessly, easily, and painlessly.” 18 And in doing so,
these print-era systems facilitate the quick research of traditional legal
arguments but hamper the research needed for innovative jurisprudence.19
Writing “at the dawn of the computer revolution”20 in 1989, Delgado and
Stefancic opined that “[c]omputerized word-search strategies promise
some hope of breaking the constraints imposed by older systems” by,
for example, allowing a researcher to “combin[e] two [index] categories
in the same search.”21 This hope had largely dissipated when Delgado and
Stefancic revisited their triple helix dilemma in 2007: “our predicament is
little better than it was in the days of searching in the dusty volumes of the
West decennial digests and, in some respects, more acute.”22 They argued
that CALR “may in fact impede the search for new legal ideas” in part
because legal training still taught lawyers to think in terms of print-era
index categories.23

15 Id. at 570.
16 Id. at 579.
17 Id. at 580 (citing Bintliff, supra note 8, at 343–44). Bintliff ’s claim, upon which Hanson’s relies, is a descriptive one:
“Lawyers in Florida and South Dakota, Ohio and Nevada, consulted the same books, used the same organizing framework,
found the same cases. The arguments crafted from these cases encouraged the best legal thinking, and gave judges the
opportunity to explore the many sides of an issue and make a decision that was understandable.” However, Bintliff ’s
descriptive claim is not obviously supported in Thinking Like a Lawyer. It appears to be a “common sense” claim rather than
one supported by historical research.
18 Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories?: Law Reform, Critical Librarianship, and the Triple
Helix Dilemma, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 207, 208 (1989).
19 Id.
20 Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do We Ask the Same Questions—The Triple Helix Dilemma Revisited, 99 Law
Libr. J. 307, 309 (2007).
21 Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 18, at 209, 219.
22 Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 20, at 310.
23 Id. at 310.
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These arguments about revolutionary changes can be understood in
context, as legal publishers consolidated, added materials, and developed
newer and more powerful computerized resources. In 1986 and 1987,
when Berring began writing on the topic, full-text searching on Westlaw
had only been available for a handful of years. And throughout the 1990s,
the habits of law students were changing. On both counts, it was certainly
worth speculating—and cautioning—about the new era to come.24 But
after a decade of relative stasis in how legal resources are created and how
legal research is conducted, we figured it was time for a reappraisal.
We have chosen to pick up this line of thought with a question
posed by Dick Danner: “How does one show what influences research
tools might have on lawyers’ thinking about the law . . . during the late
twentieth century when print digests began to be bypassed in favor of
electronic tools?”25 The first step in that process is to look at studies that
have attempted to answer it.
B. Studies of research and resources
In seeking to quantify the influence of print-era classification tools
on the habits of legal researchers, law librarians and other legal scholars
have conducted surveys and crunched numbers. There have been many
empirical studies on the topic.26 Below, we look at the ones relevant to our
question.
1. User studies

Several studies have looked at the thought processes and habits of
legal researchers to distinguish between how researchers use print or
print-era sources and how they use electronic sources and methods.
Lee Peoples set about to test whether researchers use digests or other
subject-organized systems to locate relevant legal rules but use electronic
sources, such as full-text searches, to locate relevant facts.27 To that end,
Peoples designed a study to learn whether electronic resources were
superior to print digests for locating cases with similar fact patterns.28 The
subjects were law students, and the study was conducted in 2004.29

24 Berring noted that the changes he had anticipated in the late 1980s were not as extensive as he had suspected. Berring,
Search for Cognitive Authority, supra note 6, 1707–08; see also Hanson, supra note 14, at 579.
25 Danner, supra note 2, at 129.
26 Id. at 134 n.74.
27 Lee F. Peoples, The Death of the Digest and the Pitfalls of Electronic Research: What Is the Modern Legal Researcher to
Do?, 97 Law Libr. J. 661 (2005).
28 Id. at 668.
29 Id.
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Peoples’s results cast doubt on the hypothesis that students would be
more successful locating relevant legal rules by using digests and more
successful locating relevant fact patterns by using full-text searching.30 The
study found that electronic resources were not superior to print digests for
finding cases with similar fact patterns.31 Electronic sources, likewise, were
not superior to print sources for locating relevant legal rules.32
This study is important to our inquiry because it challenges the
notion, developed in the literature, that print-era tools would be better
for locating relevant legal rules. It suggests that the structure of these
print-era tools may not be as influential on the thoughts and habits of
legal researchers as theorized. But there are a couple of problems. First,
2004 is far enough in time from the introduction of electronic sources
that differences between print-era structures and digital structures may
be hard to parse. Second, the subjects of the study were law students, who
might be presumed to have less experience with solving legal problems
and using legal sources than practicing attorneys.
A few years later, the behavior of practicing attorneys was studied by
Joseph Custer, who cast a bit more light on how researchers with more
domain-specific problem-solving experience would use legal resources.33
Custer’s survey sought to test whether (1) attorneys use more than one
system to locate relevant law, (2) some attorneys never use digests, (3)
attorneys tend to research facts more than legal rules or doctrines, and
(4) attorneys pay little attention to digest categories.34 The subjects of the
study were attorneys in Kansas.35
Significantly for us, the survey found that more than half of the
attorneys did not use digests at all.36 It also found that attorneys pay little
attention to digest categories. 37 These findings challenged assertions
that print-era digest categories led attorney researchers to think about
the law in terms of those abstract classifications.38 Instead, the findings
suggest a weak connection between practitioners and subject-based classifications of case law. However, the survey was conducted in the late
aughts, meaning it is even further in time from the introduction of digital

30 Id. at 670.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Joseph A. Custer, The Universe of Thinkable Thoughts Versus the Facts of Empirical Research, 102 Law Libr. J. 251 (2010).
34 Id. at 258. The contentions were derived from those first posed by Schanck, supra note 3.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 260.
37 Id. at 262–63.
38 Id. at 264. Custer’s criticism is mostly directed at Dabney, supra note 7.
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sources than Peoples’s study. Again, we were stymied in our search for a
study comparing how practitioners would behave with print-era sources
as compared with digital sources.
Susan Nevelow Mart tested the differences between subjectorganized case law systems created with human intervention and those
created with computer algorithms.39 The study pitted subject-organized
system against subject-organized system, and it found that researchers
were more successful using systems where case indexing was done by
humans.40 The research subjects were law students, and the study was
conducted in the early 2010s.41
Finding that a higher percentage of relevant cases are located using a
human-curated case-indexing system42 suggests that the print-era digest
systems remained powerful tools for researchers looking to find legal
rules well into the electronic era. The question remains, however, whether
print-era tools would perform the same way when they were the only
game in town.
Stefan Krieger and Katrina Fischer Kuh sought to study the
differences between the processes used in print and electronic research,
as well as the results of each.43 Law students in the early 2010s were the
subjects, and these students researched a problem and described their
research processes.44 Half used print sources and half used electronic
sources.45
The study’s findings showed that students conceived of and structured
their research differently depending on which research medium they were
using.46 The findings are at odds with those of Custer, suggesting that
“electronic researchers can, in fact, be expected to emphasize fact terms as
compared to legal concepts in their research and to rely more on primary
sources and less on secondary sources than print researchers.” 47 This
tension might be the result of the different populations studied by each,
or perhaps of the small sample size used by Krieger and Kuh. It also might
be the result of different legal research training. The study subjects were

39 Susan Nevelow Mart, The Case for Curation: The Relevance of Digest and Citator Results in Westlaw and Lexis, 32 Legal
Reference Servs. Q. 13 (2013).
40 Id. at 14–15.
41 Id. at 26.
42 Id. at 38.
43 Krieger & Kuh, supra note 1, at 762.
44 Id. at 766–67.
45 Id. at 762.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 789.
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selected in part based on the students’ print research experience beyond
the required first-year course, which typically included one print research
assignment,48 but the study does not describe how first-year students
were instructed to use print sources and electronic sources. In any event,
whether a tendency to focus on facts in research using electronic sources
suggests much of anything about the influence of print-era systems also
remains unanswered.
These studies, conducted on users of legal research systems, approach
the problems raised by Berring from different angles and ultimately do not
reach a consensus. None test attorney research habits from the print era.
To get a better sense of that, we turn now to citation studies that more
directly address the question.
2. Citation studies

Two recent studies sought to explain historical differences between
pre-CALR legal research and post-CALR legal research. Both, like ours,
are citation studies of court decisions. And both, therefore, consider the
work of practitioners—namely, judges—and draw data from the past. But
both studies also limited their scope to judicial writing, looking at citation
practices in judicial opinions but not attorneys’ briefs.
Paul Hellyer studied a sample of California Supreme Court opinions
to test whether research is more efficient using CALR tools and whether
those tools reshape the law.49 Looking at a sample of 180 cases from 1944
to 2003, Hellyer sought to identify changes in quantity, recency, and type
of legal authority cited by courts.50 Hellyer hypothesized that, if CALR
had influenced research practices, contemporary courts would be (1)
citing more cases in their opinions, (2) citing more cases from outside
their jurisdiction, (3) citing more recent cases, (4) citing authorities only
available electronically, and (5) citing more secondary sources as authoritative.51 Hellyer did find “some significant changes in the court’s citations
to legal authority,” but concluded that there was “no clear indication” that
the introduction of CALR had caused the changes.52
Hellyer’s study differs from ours in several important respects. First,
it studied only judicial behavior, and judges form only a small subset of
all practitioners. Second, it studied only citations in majority opinions,53
48 Id. at 764 n.29.
49 Paul Hellyer, Assessing the Influence of Computer-Assisted Legal Research: A Study of California Supreme Court Opinions,
97 Law Libr. J. 285 (2005).
50 Id. at 285.
51 Id. at 290.
52 Id. at 293.
53 Id.
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thus excluding citations in concurrences and dissents that might reflect
additional judicial research. Third, it excluded citations that appeared in
quotations from other cases and citations to prior opinions in the same
case, which would lead to a lower number of cited cases than our study.
And finally, by analyzing only three cases per year, the results are likely
difficult to replicate.
Next, Casey Fronk conducted an empirical analysis of 1,200 federal
appellate cases from 1957 to 2007.54 The study was designed, among other
things, to examine “quantitative and stylistic” changes in judicial citation
practices resulting from changing research sources. 55 Like our study
and unlike Hellyer’s, Fronk’s methodology relied on Westlaw’s “Table of
Authorities” feature,56 and therefore included all unique case citations in
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions.
Fronk found the greatest effect of computerized legal research on
judicial citation practices between 1977 and 1987.57 This conclusion was
reached by showing the growth of expository citation over string citation
as access to CALR increased.58 While useful in terms of showing both the
quantitative and qualitative changes in judicial citation, the study does not
examine changes in how advocates, more broadly, have conducted legal
research over time.
Hellyer’s study concluded by saying that “CALR’s effects on courts
cannot be measured by an analysis of citations in court opinions. If this is
true, what is the appropriate measurement?”59 We think we have an answer.

II. Measuring citation stickiness
Next, we introduce the citation stickiness metric and describe the
results of an initial study of the topic, and why it is useful for exploring
the concepts of legal information discovery tools and their influence on
interpreting law.

54 Casey R. Fronk, The Cost of Judicial Citation: An Empirical Investigation of Citation Practices in the Federal Appellate
Courts, 2010 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 51, 53 (2010).
55 Id. at 53, 67.
56 Id. at 67–68.
57 Id. at 78. Fronk describes the result of a 1976 study of “actual federal court research methods” that showed that federal
appellate law clerks used CALR systems from 0.26 to 7.33 hours per month, and that monthly usage by district court law
clerks was less than half that. Id. at 61 (summarizing Alan M. Sager, An Evaluation of Computer Assisted Legal
Research Systems for Federal Court Applications 77 tbl.25 (1977)).
58 Id. at 76.
59 Hellyer, supra note 49, at 298.
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Essentially, the citation stickiness metric allows us to examine the
work of both practicing attorneys and judges in the adversarial system.60
And in the context of our question, it allows us to study the level of
agreement between each party and the court about what cases are relevant
enough to cite when litigating and resolving a dispute.
Interestingly, Berring highlighted the importance of using court
opinions and briefs to study the meaning of a court’s decision.61 And the
original citation stickiness article concluded that “the variety of research
tools and methods” may explain differences in rates of citation stickiness.62
It seems, then, that our metric might expose data better able to tell us
about the structure of legal information, legal research, and the law’s
development than those used to do so in the past.
A. About citation stickiness
A citation is “sticky” if it appears in a court opinion and at least one
party’s brief. 63 Sticky citations show how often a court cites the same
authorities as at least one of the litigants.
Endogenous citations are citations that appear for the first time in an
opinion, springing from the court itself.64 These citations, necessarily, are
included as a result of independent research by courts.
Super-sticky citations are citations cited in both parties’ briefs and then
again in the court’s opinion.65 These are cases that all involved—the adversarial parties and the court—think are important to resolving the dispute.
B. Our methodology
As much as possible, we followed the same methodology as the
original citation stickiness study.
For our dataset, we selected Fourth Circuit cases from 1957 for a few
reasons. First, and most importantly, we had access to historical Fourth
Circuit briefs in our home institution’s law library collection. Second,
we wanted to be able to compare our data to 2017 data from the original
60 Kevin Bennardo & Alexa Z. Chew, Citation Stickiness, 20 J. App. Prac. & Process 61, 67 (2019) (“[C]itation stickiness
is worth studying because it provides a window into judicial decisionmaking. Judges often lament the quality of attorneys’
briefs. Attorneys often lament the quality of judges’ decisions, especially when the opinions explaining those decisions veer
away from the issues set forth in the briefs.”).
61 Berring, Search for Cognitive Authority, supra note 6, at 1703–04 (“The typical decision contains the reasoning of a judge
or judges, answering problems raised in the briefs of parties on appeal. . . . The considerable work done by appellate attorneys
does not travel with the case. Nor do links to the various sources the attorneys used.”).
62 Bennardo & Chew, supra note 60, at 108.
63 Id. at 64.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 84.
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citation stickiness study. Finally, for the year, we wanted to choose a time
definitively in the pre-CALR era.
We began our search for a sample in Westlaw’s cases database. We
narrowed to Fourth Circuit cases and then ran a plain language query of
“1957” to ensure that all cases had at least that string of numbers within
the document. We then filtered the results by date for 01/01/1957–
12/31/1957 to ensure our 1957 cases were indeed decided in 1957. This
gave us 181 total cases.
Then, we eliminated cases where there would not be a full opinion or
where there might be confounding “noise” from briefing by nonparties.
So within our results we searched for “curiam OR amicus OR amici”
and eliminated any cases returned. There were 74 cases matching, so we
subtracted those from our total, leaving us with 107 cases.
We also had to figure out how to get citations from the parties’ briefs
reliably. Since briefs from 1957 are not available on Westlaw, we relied
on the print collection of Fourth Circuit briefs at the University of North
Carolina’s Kathrine R. Everett Law Library. These briefs were conveniently
located at our institution and could be scanned on-site for data collection.
Local court rules also required that parties create tables of authorities
cited and include them with their filings.66 Like the original study, we
excluded cases in which there were supplemental briefs or amicus briefs
in order to capture cases progressing along the traditional pathway of
appellant brief, appellee brief, and (when included) appellant’s reply
brief.67 One case was also excluded as one of its briefs cited no cases.68
We verified that the briefing in each case met our criteria. We also
excluded cases from 1957 if all briefs were not available in typeset format
in the print collection. The title page of each brief was scanned as was
the table of authorities cited. The unique citations from the tables of
authorities were entered into our spreadsheets.
To collect the 1987 dataset, we followed the same procedure as for the
1957 dataset except to substitute 1987 for 1957 in the Westlaw searches
and filters. Like the 1957 briefs, the 1987 briefs are not on Westlaw
but are in our institution’s print collection. An in-depth description
of data collection from the 2017 cases can be found in the original
citation stickiness publication.69 The main difference among the dataset
collections, however, is that unpublished opinions also needed to be
removed from the samples in 1987 and 2017.
66 Revised Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Rule 10 §§ 2(a), 4(a), 5 (1952).
67 Bennardo & Chew, supra note 60, at 79.
68 Brief of Appellee, United States v. One 1955 Model Ford Convertible Auto., 241 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1957).
69 Bennardo & Chew, supra note 60, at 78–81.
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At first, we planned to select the first 25 cases from each year 1957
and 1987 because the original study used 25 cases from each circuit,
including the Fourth. That sampling method was chosen to ensure
diversity of subject matter and a practically (but not perfectly) random
sample. That said, then as now—the number of citations, not the number
of cases—is the relevant sample size. After beginning our data analysis
and realizing that each case’s opinion had far fewer citations in 1957 and
1987 than in 2017, we increased the number of cases we reviewed so that
the sample size of citations would be closer to the 2017 sample sizes.
Now, for the size of our samples. The 25 cases from 2017 contained
436 unique citations to decisional authority.70 The briefs in those cases
contained 2,002 unique citations to decisional authority. The 28 cases
from 1987 contained 236 unique citations to decisional authority. The
briefs in those cases contained 1,018 unique citations to decisional
authority. The 27 cases from 1957 contained 309 unique citations to decisional authority. The briefs in those cases contained 1,057 unique citations
to decisional authority. As in the original citation stickiness study, the
relevant sample sizes are the numbers of unique citations in judicial
opinions and the number of unique citations in briefs. The sample sizes
were large enough to show significant differences in the stickiness rates as
measured by confidence intervals.71

III. Results
The results of our citation study surprised us. We hypothesized that
we would see a higher rate of citation stickiness in pre-CALR opinions
based on the more coherent nature of case-finding done using the digests
and with a more limited set of published authorities to draw from. In fact,
we found that the opposite was true. The rate of citation stickiness was
lower in the earlier cases, and higher in the post-CALR opinions. For
the 1987 cases, decided right in the middle of 1957 and 2017, the rate of
stickiness was also in the middle.

70 Decisional authorities result from decisions made by judges and similar decisionmakers. See Bennardo & Chew, supra
note 60, at 81 n.77; see also William H. Manz, Citations in Supreme Court Opinions and Briefs: A Comparative Study, 94
Law Libr. J. 267, 267–68 (2002). The Manz study included citations to judicial opinions and administrative decisions, but
excluded citations to constitutions, statutes, and regulations. Manz, supra note 70, at 268.
71 As in the original Citation Stickiness article, we calculated 95% confidence intervals using the Exact test in Stata. See
Bennardo & Chew, supra note 60, at 83. As the original article explained, “A confidence interval expresses the percentage
probability that data lies between two limits.” Id. at 83 n.80 (citing Alan R. Jones, Probability, Statistics and other
Frightening Stuff 102 (2019)).
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A. Some specifics
In the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit cases sampled
from 2017, 55% of citations in the opinion were sticky, meaning they
were cited in at least one party’s brief. In 1957 cases sampled from the
same circuit, only 44% of citations in the opinions were sticky. This is a
significant difference.72 In 1987 cases from the Fourth Circuit, 48% of
citations in the opinions were sticky. This is not a significant difference
from the 55% stickiness rate in the 2017 cases or the 44% stickiness rate in
the 1957 cases.73
What this means is that the court in 1957, before the advent of
computer-assisted legal research, introduced cases to its opinions without
those cases having been raised in either party’s brief 56% of the time. In
1987, the court did this 52% of the time. And in 2017, the court did this
only 45% of the time. The court, then, was more likely to identify relevant
authority on its own—endogenously—when the universe of case finding
tools was more unified and the number of available cases was smaller.
When looking at “super sticky” citations, our findings show a similar
trend of disagreement over relevant decisional authority and, perhaps,
incoherence in legal doctrine in pre-CALR cases when compared with
post-CALR cases. In 2017, unique cases cited in court opinions appeared
in both parties’ briefs 28% of the time. In 1987, unique cases cited in court
opinions appeared in both parties’ briefs 22% of the time. And in 1957,
unique cases cited in court opinions appeared in both parties’ briefs only
15% of the time. In other words, nearly 3 out of every 10 cases cited by
a court were also cited by both parties in 2017, whereas in 1957, that
happened about 3 out of every 20 times—or half as often.
Put yet another way, imagine that, after the attorneys for both sides of
a case thoroughly researched and argued their sides to the Fourth Circuit
in 1957, both attorneys sat down together to read the court’s opinion. Our
results show that 8.5 times out of 10, at least one of the attorneys might
think, why didn’t I cite that case?

72 The 95% confidence intervals do not overlap for these two sets of citations:
1957: 38.71%–50.07%
2017: 50.24%–59.78%
73 The 95% confidence intervals do overlap for the other pairs of citations:
1957: 38.71%–50.07%
1987: 41.36%–54.46%
2017: 50.24%–59.78%
Note that the confidence interval is much tighter for 2017 than for the earlier years; this is a function of the sample size (436
case citations in the opinions) being about 50% larger than the sample size of the earlier years (309 for 1957 and 236 for
1987).
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1957

1987

2017

Unique citations

1,229

1,141

2,198

Sticky citations: appeared in opinion and at
least one brief

44%

48%

55%

Super sticky citations: appeared in opinion
and both briefs

15%

22%

28%

Citations in briefs that appeared in opinions

13%

11%

12%

Average number of cases cited per opinion

11

9.4

17.4

Average number of cases cited by parties

37.8

40.7

80.1

Average number of sticky cites per opinion

4.9

4.5

9.6

Average number of endogenous cites per
opinion

6.1

4.9

7.8

B. Some interpretations and wild speculation
Our results show how often the Fourth Circuit cited to the same
authorities as the parties at three moments in time.74 Over our sixty-year
study period, we observed that stickiness increased from 1957 to 1987
to 2017. This at least means that, pre-CALR, there was less coherence or
agreement between advocates and courts than previously believed. This is
counter to much of the commentary.
We think this is an interesting finding on its own, but inquiring
minds want to know why citation stickiness increased over this period,
even though the dominant theory predicted that citation stickiness would
decrease as CALR exploded the cozy universe of thinkable thoughts.
We have some ideas, which you can read once you finish this paragraph.
But first, a few things are probably not causing the upward trend.75 We
can probably eliminate some causes based on prior research: Per Fronk,
changes in judicial style, workload, and so on are unlikely drivers of citation
stickiness.76 Other unlikely drivers include individual judge characteristics, such as experience, party affiliation, or judicial role, per the original
citation stickiness study.77 Now, on to the causes that have more potential.
First, researchers might be converging on the same cases because
tools measuring depth of treatment were easily available in 2017. Hanson
argued that a big problem with the digests is that there was “no evaluative
74 See Bennardo & Chew, supra note 60, at 105.
75 For our thoughts on what could be causing the upward trend, see infra section III.C.
76 Fronk, supra note 54, at 79.
77 Id. at 110–11.
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component” with the case-finding tool that would “help the researcher
separate the important [cases] from the vast majority that merely
mentioned the relevant point of law without making a notable contribution to it.”78 Now, on Westlaw for example, word searches, citators, and
tables of authority all produce lists of cases with an icon indicating depth
of treatment. The “atleast” connector also makes it easy for researchers to
limit results to cases that use a particular word many times, a rough proxy
for depth of treatment in the word search context.
Second, stickiness might have risen in the Fourth Circuit over the
past 60 years because of the increasing rigor in research and writing
instruction during law school.79 This rigor has become more uniform
across law schools in the past 30 years, which might lead to attorneys
and judges using similar methods for locating relevant precedent, which
leads to similar research results and thus cited cases. For example, more
attorneys and judges would have learned how to use depth of treatment
tools during law school, both because these tools exist now and because
research instruction has increased.
Third, perhaps because of reasons one and two, lawyers might
be better now at finding cases that judges agree are relevant enough to
include in their written decisions. The average number of sticky cites
per opinion doubled from 1957 to 2017, going from 4.9 sticky cites per
opinion to 9.6. This increase tracks the increase in the average number
of cases that the parties cite, which has also doubled from 1957 to 2017,
going from 37.8 cases to 80.1. However, the average number of citations
in opinions did not increase at the same rate: the 2017 opinions had about
1.6 times the number of citations as the 1957 cases. So, by doubling the
number of cases cited in briefs, parties have doubled the number of sticky
cases in those briefs, even though the percentage of sticky cases cited in
the briefs has stayed the same.
Fourth, Fronk’s documented decrease in string cite usage as a
percentage of overall opinion cites could increase stickiness by limiting
the number of new cases that a court introduces by string cite.80 Fronk
also reasoned that the increase in expository citation suggested that
judges were spending more research energy per cite, despite a “caseload
explosion” of 630% from 1955 to 2005. 81 If Fronk is correct that the

78 Hanson, supra note 14, at 569.
79 The Fourth Circuit does not track exactly with the results of Marvell’s citation stickiness study from the early 1970s,
which found a citation stickiness rate of 55% for 30 Sixth Circuit civil opinions issued in 1971 and 1972. See Thomas B.
Marvell, Appellate Courts and Lawyers: Information Gathering in the Adversarial System 134–36 (1978).
80 See Fronk, supra note 54, at 69.
81 Id. at 79.
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research cost per cite has increased over time, then the cost of finding and
adding endogenous citations to an opinion would likely be higher than the
cost of adding sticky citations that have already been vetted and described
by the parties. However, this explanation seems less convincing given
the increase in number of endogenous cites in opinions has increased
(although not by much) from 6.1 in 1957 to 7.8 in 2017.
Fifth, it is also possible that CALR algorithms have changed to
push advocates and courts closer to one another. Having adjusted to the
wilds of text searching, research scholarship has turned to how research
platforms’ algorithms influence research results. While search algorithms
rank results differently across platforms,82 perhaps within a platform, like
Westlaw, the results of case law searches are more uniform than the results
generated using a print digest.83 In simple terms, attorneys and judges in
2017 might have been seeing more of the same cases in their research of
a topic than technology had allowed before, by virtue of improved (or at
least more consistent) search algorithms on the same platform. This is
a fertile and growing area of scholarship in legal information, and more
study is needed to determine the degree of algorithmic influence on legal
citation practices.
Finally, judges in 2017 might have been purposefully limiting
endogenous citations as part of an overall trend towards judicial minimalism. Judicial minimalism, nicely summarized by Lauren Cyphers in her
student note, “is a case-by-case approach that looks only to the specific set
of facts before it and crafts a decision narrowly tailored to those unique
facts.”84 Delgado and Stefancic raised this possibility in 2007, concluding
that electronic searching can “lead to judicial minimalism—narrow, factbased decision making that ignores emerging legal theories and decides
cases on the narrowest possible grounds.” 85 Their reasoning was that
CALR was better at finding concrete examples than abstract patterns,
and thus fact-based searching “can easily cause you to miss [a new legal
theory] that is emerging in another jurisdiction.”86 This reasoning aligns
82 Susan Nevelow Mart, The Algorithm as a Human Artifact: Implications for Legal [Re]Search, 109 Law Libr. J. 387 (2017).
83 However, research into the use of natural language processing posits that algorithms using the technology “ground
[themselves] in the forms and functions of cognitive authority of the past—perhaps such as giving cognizance to most-cited
cases, adhering to jurisdictions, performing citation analysis, building on West’s Topic and Key Number System, emphasizing cases annotated in American Law Reports, or any number of a hundred factors that make up the current terrain of
the legal information environment.” Paul D. Callister, Law, Artificial Intelligence, and Natural Language Processing: A Funny
Thing Happened on the Way to My Search Results, 112 Law Libr. J. 161, 167 (2020).
84 Lauren Cyphers, Note, Maximalist Decision Making: When Maximalism Is Appropriate for Appellate Courts, 123 W. Va.
L. Rev. 611, 612 (2020) (citing Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time ix–x (1999)); Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a
Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1951, 1952 (2005)).
85 Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 20, at 323–24 (suggesting Margaret J. Radin & Frank Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructural Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1019 (1991), to learn more about the philosophy of legal minimalism).
86 Id. at 324.
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with Krieger and Kuh’s study results from a few years later, that electronic
researchers used fact-based searching far more than paper researchers.
C. Wild speculation about creating a coherence measurement
It appears that we cannot yet use our results to show that stickiness
means a shared sense of relevance, that is, whether the parties and
court share a cozy universe of legal authorities. Yet we also wonder why
stickiness wouldn’t mean exactly that? Wouldn’t a focus on appellate
matters studied show more of the “legal concepts” than the facts?
For example, imagine a new metric called “party stickiness” or “party
coherence” that looked at the number of times both parties cited a case,
and whether the court also cited it. The number of times both parties cited
a case would be the numerator of our new metric, but the denominator
could be several things: the number of unique cases cited in the briefs,
the number of unique cases cited in the briefs and opinion, or even the
number of unique cases cited in the opinions. We did those calculations
with our data, but we are still thinking about what they might mean, if
anything. They are in the table below.
All

1957

1987

2017

Cases cited by both parties

637

130

169

338

Cases cited by both parties and opinion

222

45

51

126

Cases cited by both parties but not the
opinion

415

85

118

212

Percent of cases cited by both parties
out of all brief cites

16%

12%

17%

17%

Percent of cases cited by both parties
but not in the opinion

10%

8%

12%

11%

Percent of cases cited by both parties
compared to number of opinion cites

65%

42%

72%

78%

To see whether citation stickiness could measure coherence will likely
require looking at how courts use the sticky citations in their opinions,
not just counting them. Both this study and the original citation stickiness
study shied away from studying use because it is so time consuming.
However, Brian N. Larson set out to do just that in two ambitious papers:
Precedent as Rational Persuasion 87 and Endogenous & Dangerous. 88
Larson’s studies analyzed federal district court opinions addressing
87 Brian N. Larson, Precedent as Rational Persuasion, 25 Legal Writing 135 (2021).
88 Brian N. Larson, Endogenous & Dangerous, 22 Nev. L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2022).
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dispositive motions, with the specific legal issue studied being the affirmative defense of fair use to copyright infringement.89 Although these
first two studies used federal district court opinions, Larson is following
these matters through appeal (if any), and the results of that stage of his
study could help refine a coherence measurement, particularly because
Larson expressly engages with the literature on citation stickiness and
endogeneity.90
D. So many ideas for future study
This article asks a narrow question and does its best to answer that
narrow question. However, it has generated many other questions that
might be answerable with our dataset.
We describe some of those future research questions below and
intend to broaden the scope of our project to address them in a longer
article. For the richness of these questions, we are particularly grateful to
the participants of the Little Boulder Conference with whom we workshopped this paper, to Brian Larson and the faculties at Texas A&M
University School of Law and Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School
of Law who workshopped this paper with us, and to the attendees and
organizers of the Yale Virtual Symposium on Citation and the Law.
1. Increase our sample size for 1957 and 1987

The sample sizes for this symposium paper are uneven, and we
would like to increase the sample sizes for 1957 and 1987 to be closer
to the sample size for 2017. Doing so would require adding about 1,000
more opinion citations for each of 1957 and 1987. Gathering the opinion
citations itself is not that difficult because they are available on Westlaw.
But gathering the parties’ citations for each of those opinions must be
done by hand, using paper copies of the briefs that are archived at our
university. Although the stickiness percentages for 1957 and 2017 are
significant when considering 95% confidence intervals, larger sample sizes
should improve the precision of our stickiness calculations.
2. Figure out that coherence measurement

We recognize that our analysis of a stickiness-based coherence
measurement is incomplete. With some more thinking, we hope to
complete the analysis and identify a useful measure of coherence.

89 Id. at ___.
90 Another recent citation study does analyze how judges use citations in their opinions, but it does not engage with either
Larson’s work or Bennardo & Chew’s. See Mark Cooney, What Judges Cite: A Study of Three Appellate Courts, 50 Stetson
L. Rev. 1 (2020).
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3. Test whether endogenous cites support procedural rules

Since the first presentation on the initial data of the first citation
stickiness paper, the most-asked question is how many of the endogenous
cites are cases that support procedural rules like the standard of review.
Because attorneys and chambers can have stock language that they use
to describe procedural rules, one set of cases used to describe the 12(b)
(6) standard could be entirely different from another set of cases used to
describe the same standard in basically the same way. Differences in stock
procedural language would lead to lower stickiness without a difference in
meaning, or even meaningful research.
Since the original stickiness paper was published, Brian Larson has
created a coding system for categorizing how courts use each statement of
law and citation in a judicial opinion. We can use Larson’s system to code
our Fourth Circuit data set to look for procedural rules and their uses.
This would help answer the most frequently asked question and tie our
study more closely with Larson’s ongoing study of endogenous citations.
With this later analysis in mind, we did a small pilot study using the
ten opinions with the most endogenous citations in them from 1957, 1987,
and 2017. These opinions yielded 128 endogenous citations in 1957, 95
in 1987, and 136 in 2017. We asked our research assistant to go through
those thirty opinions and identify endogenous citations that obviously
supported an appellate standard of review. We asked him to look for the
“obvious” ones because sometimes reasonable minds can disagree as to
whether a statement of law is “procedural” or “substantive.” The results of
this informal pilot showed an increase in endogenous procedural citations
over time: 3% of endogenous cites in 1957, 14% in 1987, and 18% in 2017.
The 95% confidence interval for the 2017 percentage is 12.3%–25.9%,
which suggests that procedural “boilerplate” accounted for a chunk of the
endogenous cites in the original 2017 study. By contrast, the confidence
interval for the 1957 percentage dips down to nearly zero. Because so few
endogenous cites in 1957 were procedural, these initial results suggest
that the increase in stickiness is not related to procedural citations. If
nothing else, this pilot suggests a notable change in the way courts cite
cases to support the standard of review from 1957 to 2017.
4. Analyze the weight of the endogenous authorities

Another frequently asked question is what courts the endogenous
citations come from. This question is also one that is commonly addressed
in citation studies but that neither this study nor the original citation
stickiness study sought to answer. Answering this question for our data set
would again both sate the curious minds of our audience and also tie our
study in with other citation studies, particularly Larson’s.
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Our small pilot study described just above included identifying each
endogenous citation’s issuing court. Our initial results are summarized in
the table below and show an increase in endogenous cites to other Fourth
Circuit cases and a decrease to other circuit cases. The other court categories don’t suggest a pattern.
Cited Court

1957

1987

2017

U.S. Supreme Court

20%

34%

16%

Fourth Circuit

10%

22%

36%

Other federal circuit

33%

26%

10%

Federal district court

12%

12%

15%

State high court

15%

4%

13%

State intermediate appellate court

1%

0%

4%

5. Analyze the frequency of endogenous citations in string citations

Given Fronk’s findings, string citations could be a large source of
endogenous citations in judicial samples. His study suggests that the
percentage of opinion cites that exist only in string cites would be highest
in the 1957 cases, much lower in the 1987 cases, and lower still in the 2017
cases. That Fronk’s study also used years ending in seven is particularly
fortuitous for comparing his results and ours.
Our small pilot study included this string cite analysis. Our initial
results track Fronk’s findings and are summarized in the table below.
In addition to string citations, we counted endogenous citations that
appeared only as citing or quoting parentheticals or only as part of
a quotation. One observation is that the 1957 opinions included 21
endogenous citations in footnotes, which decreased to 9 in 1987 and only
1 in 2017. Some of these footnoted citations were also string citations.
1957

1987

2017

Only in a string citation

58%

49%

21%

Only in a citing parenthetical

0%

1%

4%

Only in a quoting parenthetical

0%

1%

7%

Only in a quotation

8%

2%

0%

Only in subsequent history

< 1%

0%

< 1%

Only in footnote

16%

9%

< 1%
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6. Analyze Judge Widener’s use of endogenous citations

Fronk’s study analyzed the individual citation practices of two longserving circuit court judges, including one from the Fourth Circuit, Judge
H. Emory Widener Jr. 91 Judge Widener served on the Fourth Circuit
from 1972 to 2008, and Fronk analyzed 397 of Judge Widener’s majority
opinions, which had 4,393 unique case citations. 92 Fronk found that
Judge Widener’s citation patterns changed across time, closely matching
the aggregate data that Fronk collected.93 For example, his use of string
citation steadily declined from over 21 percent in 1972–1977 to under 9
percent three decades later.94 One of Fronk’s takeaways from his longitudinal looks at two judges’ citation practices is that CALR might have
had a “conforming” effect on judges’ citation practices.95
Again, because our dataset overlaps with Fronk’s, we could add on
to his longitudinal study of Judge Widener’s citation patterns by calculating the stickiness of his opinions over that same time period. This might
tell us something about the connection between the changes in judicial
citation practices that Fronk observed and courts’ independent research.
7. Look at historical research instruction practices

One potential reason that citation stickiness has increased over time
is a change in legal research instruction to be more uniform. And with
respect to coherence, more uniform research instruction seems more
likely to result in greater coherence. This study did not look at historical
research instruction practices to see if they match that theory, but a future
study could.
8. Look at historical court rules for citation

Current federal court rules require parties to substantiate their
arguments with citations to relevant legal authorities. But Fronk’s study
shows that the ways judges cited legal authorities changed across time.
Studying historical court rules could lend insight into the ways that parties
cite legal authorities.
9. Study opinions with novel legal theories

A recurring concern with both print-era research methods and CALR
is that they stifle innovative legal theories and, specifically, innovative
jurisprudence.96 If so, judicial opinions that advance novel legal theories
91 Fronk, supra note 54, at 80.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 84.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 87.
96 See generally Nicholas Mignanelli, Critical Legal Research: Who Needs It?, 112 L. Libr. J. 327 (2020).
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should have more endogenous citations. But if innovative jurisprudence
grows from advocates’ efforts, the judicial opinions should have fewer
endogenous citations. A future study could, then, focus on opinions that
advance novel legal theories, perhaps as noted by legal scholars, including
student notes and recent developments. This would show whether the
cites that advance that novel theory are sticky or endogenous.
10. Repeat the study in 2037

By the time we finish with future studies 1 through 9 above, it will
probably be time to add another 20-year block to our study!

Conclusion
In this study, we sought to bring together several strands of legal
scholarship: theory about the effect of CALR on legal research, studies of
research and citation practice by courts, studies of research practice by
attorneys and law students, and studies directly comparing court citations
and party citations in the same matter. Our primary empirical question
was straightforward: during the print era, did courts cite the same cases
as the parties more often than during the digital era, as posited by the
universe of thinkable thoughts theory? The answer was similarly straightforward: No. The results show that, pre-CALR, there was less agreement
between advocates and courts than previously believed by many commentators. If a limited universe of thinkable thoughts existed in the print era,
it was not cozy enough for the attorneys and judges to cite the same cases
during the appellate process.

